We study whether the sensitivity of Swedish interest rates to economic news was a¤ected by the zero lower bound and the Riksbank's monetary policies. Our results suggest that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish macroeconomic news was reduced at the e¤ective zero lower bound at short maturities but not at longer maturities. We also …nd that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to this news was not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by forward guidance. Finally, we conclude that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to news was not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by unconventional monetary policy.
The e¤ect of the zero lower bound, forward guidance and unconventional monetary policy on interest rate sensitivity to economic news in Sweden 
I. Introduction
In several countries, including Sweden, the monetary authorities reduced policy rates to levels (close to) zero to counter the economic downturn due to the recent …nancial crisis. Even when policy rates are at the zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy may still be e¤ective through unconventional policies, such as asset purchase programs and liquidity support, and communication on the forward path of policy rates, better known as forward guidance . As long-term rates are more relevant for economic decisions than the current level of the overnight rate, any action by the central bank that in ‡uences interest rate expectations could be a potential tool for monetary policy, even if current short-term rates cannot be In Sweden, the Riksbank's most important policy rate, the repo rate, was at the zero lower bound between 8 July 2009 and 6 July 2010. 1 As to unconventional policy, Sveriges Riksbank Already before the crisis, the Riksbank had introduced forward guidance. On 15 February 2007 , the Riksbank published quarterly forecasts of the repo rate for the …rst time. In April 2009, the Riksbank reduced the policy rate to 0.5% and indicated that 'the repo rate is expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011'; in July 2009, the Riksbank reduced the policy rate to 0.25%, and changed its explicit policy rate guidance to that 'the repo rate is expected to remain at this low level until autumn 2010'. 2 1 See http://www.riksbank.se/en/Interest-and-exchange-rates/Repo-rate-table/. The Executive Board's decision to cut the repo rate to 0.25% was announced on 2 July 2009, and its decision to increase the repo rate to 0.5% was announced on 1 July 2010. These changes in the repo rate became e¤ective on 8 July 2009 and 7 July 2010, respectively. 2 An overview of these repo announcements is available at: http://www.riksbank.se/en/Monetary-2 Recently, Williams (2012, 2013) proposed a novel way to investigate the e¤ec-tiveness of monetary policy when policy rates are (close to) zero. They estimate the time-varying sensitivity of yields to macroeconomic announcements using high-frequency data and compare that sensitivity to a benchmark period in which the ZLB was not a concern. If a particular yield is about as sensitive to news as in the benchmark sample, it is unconstrained. In contrast, if the yield responds very little or not at all to news, it is largely or completely constrained.
Following Williams (2012, 2013) , we study whether the sensitivity to economic news of short-to long-term interest rates implied by interest rate swaps in Sweden was a¤ected by the e¤ective zero lower bound of the policy rate. We interpret the sensitivity of longer-term interest rates to economic news as a measure of the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower bound. We also investigate whether the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to economic news was a¤ected by the introduction of forward guidance and unconventional monetary policies by the Riksbank. We interpret a reduction in the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to domestic economic news with the introduction of policy rate forecasts as evidence that …nancial market participants do not understand the conditionality of the guidance and focus on it too much, as in Moessner and Nelson (2008) .
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II o¤ers a discussion of the literature and describes the Riksbank's policies during the …nancial crisis. Section III presents the data, section IV presents the estimation method and discusses the results, while section V concludes.
II. Background
Policy options in times of crisis A …rst set of policy options centre around the zero lower bound. The 2007-2009 global …nancial crisis was not the …rst occasion on which policy rates were closing in on the zero lower bound.
In the early 2000s, short-term interest rates were close to, or at zero, in a number of countries, including Japan, the United States, and Switzerland (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack, 2004) .
Therefore, the options available for monetary policy at the ZLB have been discussed for some time in the literature. The starting point is that long-term interest rates are more relevant for economic decisions than the current level of the policy rate. Therefore, not only the current level of the policy rate, but also the entire path of expected future rates determines the e¤ect 
III. Data
We use daily data on interest rate swaps with maturities of 1, 2, 5 and 10 years between 1 June 1998 and 31 May 2013 from Bloomberg. Figure 4 shows the development in swap rates over the sample period. Between 1998 and 2005 rates mostly moved in a band between 2 and 6 percent. [ Figure 4 about here]
IV. Method and results
We regress daily changes in interest rate swaps with maturities of m =1, 2, 5 and 10 years, y m (t) y m (t 1), in basis points, on the normalized surprise components of US and domestic economic data releases, sur U S j (t) and sur d j (t), respectively, and interact the right-hand side variables with a dummy variable for the zero lower bound of the policy rate, dum ZLB (t). The regression equation takes the form
where the superscript d refers to domestic Swedish data, n d is the number of domestic macroeconomic indicators, and n U S = 11 is the number of US macroeconomic indicators included in the regression. The Executive Board's decision to cut the repo rate to 0.25% was announced on 2 July 2009, and its decision to increase the repo rate to 0.5% was announced on 1 July 2010.
These changes in the repo rate became e¤ective on 8 July 2009 and 7 July 2010, respectively.
Since e¢ cient market prices incorporate news at the time of its announcements, we de…ne the dummy variable dum ZLB (t) based on the announcement dates of the repo rate changes. The dummy variable dum ZLB (t) takes on the value of one from 2 July 2009, the day the repo rate cut to 0.25% was announced, to 30 June 2010, the day before the repo rate increase to 0.5% was announced, and and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using nonlinear least squares and Newey-West adjusted standard errors.
[ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The results for equation (1) are shown in Table 1 The results suggest that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish macroeconomic news is reduced by around 80% at the zero lower bound for the shorter maturities of 1 and 2 years, at the 1% signi…cance level, but is una¤ected at the longer maturities of 5 and 10 years. The sensitivity of interest rate swaps to US macroeconomic news is not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the zero lower bound. Table 2 shows the corresponding regressions when only surprises concerning Swedish CPI in ‡ation are included (n d = 1) along with surprises concerning US indicators. Similar to the …ndings as reported in Table 1 , the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish CPI in ‡ation surprises is reduced by around 80% at the zero lower bound for maturities of 1 and 2 years, but now at the 1% signi…cance level at the 1-year maturity and only at the 5% signi…cance level at the 2-year maturity, and it is una¤ected at the longer maturities of 5 and 10 years. The result that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to US macroeconomic news is not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the zero lower bound also holds.
These results suggest that monetary policy remained e¤ective at the zero lower bound at longer horizons in Sweden. This could be due to the forward guidance by the Riksbank, which was already in place before the height of the global …nancial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as well as unconventional monetary policy measures mentioned above. In the next steps of the analysis we therefore zoom in on the periods during which these policies were in place.
First, we investigate whether the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to economic news is a¤ected by the introduction of forward guidance by the Riksbank. To do so, we regress daily changes in interest rate swaps on the surprise components of US and domestic economic data releases, and now interact the right-hand side variables with a dummy variable for the period when the Riksbank provided forward guidance, dum F G (t). The regression equation takes the form
The dummy variable dum F G (t) takes the value of one after the Riksbank started publishing forecasts of its policy rate, i.e. 15 February 2007, and is zero otherwise.
[ Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The results for equation (2) when news on all Swedish macroeconomic indicators is included Table 3 . The results suggest that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish macroeconomic news is not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the forward guidance. This implies that market participants did not reduce their attention to Swedish macroeconomic news, which suggests that they understood the conditionality of the Riksbank's policy rate forecasts and did not take them as unconditional commitments. The sensitivity of interest rate swaps to US macroeconomic news is reduced by around 35% at the 5% signi…cance level for maturities of 2 and 10 years by the introduction of forward guidance. For the other maturities, the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable is also negative, but it is not signi…cant at the 10% level. This suggests that the Riksbank's forward guidance led market participants to focus somewhat less on US news, which is not necessarily a sign that they did not understand the conditionality of the forward guidance, but might be a desirable reduction of attention paid to international news, possibly due to a better understanding of the Riksbank's reaction function.
The corresponding results for equation (2) October 2010, i.e. the day before the last of its one-year …xed-interest rate loans was repaid.
The regression equation takes the form
The dummy variable dum U M P (t) takes on the value of one from 24 September 2008 to 6 October 2010, and zero otherwise. This period includes the Riksbank's liquidity provision in US dollars and at …xed interest rates at the 12-month maturity in Swedish kronor (see Figure 2) , which led to a large increase in the size of the Riksbank's balance sheet (see Figure 3 ).
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here]
The results for equation (3) when all Swedish news indicators are included are shown in Table   5 . We can see that neither the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish nor to US news is signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the Riksbank's unconventional monetary policies. The same results hold when only Swedish CPI surprises along with US news indicators are included, as shown in Table 6 .
Next, we include the dummy variables for the zero lower bound, the Riksbank's forward guidance and the Riksbank's unconventional monetary policy in a single regression,
The results for equation (4) when all Swedish macroeconomic indicators are included are shown in Table 7 . Compared to the results reported in Table 1 , the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to domestic news continues to be signi…cantly reduced by the zero lower bound at the 2-year maturity, but at a lower signi…cance level of 5%, and with a larger reduction of around 100%, while it is no longer a¤ected at the 1-year maturity. It also continues to be una¤ected at the longer maturities of 5 and 10 years. The sensitivity of interest rate swaps to US news continues to be una¤ected by the zero lower bound. We can also see that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to domestic macroeconomic news continues not to be signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the Riksbank's forward guidance. But now the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to US macroeconomic news is reduced by the Riksbank's forward guidance at the 5% or 1%
signi…cance level for all of the maturities of 1, 2, 5 and 10 years, and not just at two of the maturities as was the case in Table 3 , and by a larger amount of around 45% to 50%. Moreover, the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish and US news continues not to be signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the Riksbank's unconventional monetary policies. The results for equation (4) when only Swedish CPI news is included along with news about US macroeconomic indicators are shown in Table 8 . The results just described for Table 7 carry over, except that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to domestic news is no longer a¤ected by the zero lower bound at the 2-year maturity.
[ Tables 7 and 8 about here]
Finally, we report results of Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on the dummy variables interacted with macroeconomic data surprises are equal to -1, for each of the regressions performed above (see Table 9 ). A coe¢ cient of -1 would imply that the reactions to macroeconomic news have been completely attenuated. The most striking result is that we can reject at the 10% level in almost all cases that the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable for forward guidance is equal to -1, both when interacted with Swedish and US data surprises, and both for the individual regressions of Tables 3 and 4 and for the combined regressions of Tables 7 and 8 .
The only exception is for g F G on Swedish CPI in ‡ation surprises for the regression of Tables 4   and 8 , where a value of -1 cannot be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels, although the p-values are small (p-values of 0.13 and 0.11, respectively). For the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable for the zero lower bound, we can reject a value of -1 at the 10% level in all cases for US data surprises, but in none of the cases for Swedish data surprises. This is consistent with …nding no signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient for the dummy variable for the zero lower bound interacted with US data surprises in Tables 1, 2 , 7 and 8. It is also consistent with …nding a signi…cantly negative value for g ZLB for Swedish data surprises in the regressions of Tables 1   and 2 for the 1-and 2-year maturities, and partly re ‡ects large standard errors for the 5-and 10-year maturities, for which g ZLB is not signi…cantly negative. For the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable for unconventional monetary policies, we can reject a value of -1 at the 10% level in all cases for US data surprises, which is consistent with …nding no signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient for the dummy variable for unconventional monetary policies interacted with US data surprises in Tables 5 to 8 . But we cannot reject a value of -1 at the 10% level in some cases when the dummy variable for unconventional monetary policy is interacted with Swedish data surprises, even though none of the coe¢ cients is signi…cant in Tables 5 to 8 , which partly re ‡ects large standard errors.
[ Table 9 about here]
V. Conclusions
We study whether the sensitivity to economic news of short-to long-term interest rates implied by interest rate swaps in Sweden was a¤ected by the zero lower bound of the policy rate. We interpret the sensitivity of longer-term yields to economic news as a measure of the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. We also investigate whether the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to economic news was a¤ected by the introduction of forward guidance and unconventional monetary policies by the Riksbank. We interpret a reduction in the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to domestic economic news with the introduction of forward guidance as evidence that …nancial market participants do not understand the conditionality of the guidance.
We …nd some evidence that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish macroeconomic news was reduced at the zero lower bound for the shorter maturities of 1 and 2 years, but was una¤ected at the longer maturities of 5 and 10 years. This suggests that monetary policy remained e¤ective at the zero lower bound at longer horizons in Sweden. This could be due to forward guidance by the Riksbank, which was already in place before the height of the global …nancial crisis, as well as unconventional monetary policy measures. We also …nd that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish macroeconomic news was not signi…cantly affected at any maturity by the forward guidance. This implies that market participants did not reduce their attention to Swedish macroeconomic news, which suggests that they understood the conditionality of the Riksbank's policy rate forecasts, and did not take them as uncondi-tional commitments. Our results also suggest that the Riksbank's forward guidance led market participants to focus somewhat less on US news, which is not necessarily a sign that they did not understand the conditionality of the forward guidance. In fact, it might be a desirable reduction of the attention paid to international news, possibly due to a better understanding of the Riksbank's reaction function. Moreover, we …nd that the sensitivity of interest rate swaps to Swedish and US macroeconomic news was not signi…cantly a¤ected at any maturity by the Riksbank's unconventional monetary policies. 
